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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this court is proper, and not disputed by the plaintiff. A
final judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff on cross motions for
summary judgment.

The arguments were made to the Honorable J o h n R.

Anderson in the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for the County of
Uintah.

On October 3, 1996, Judge Anderson signed an order granting

j u d g m e n t in favor of the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court h a d appellate

jurisdiction p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2. The Supreme Court
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS CENTRAL TO THE APPEAL
Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-3.
Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-3.1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 17, 1994, Joseph Price was a passenger in a vehicle owned
and operated by David Gurr. The vehicle in which he was a passenger rolled,
ejecting Joseph Price and resulting in his death.
Debra Turney ("Turney"), the defendant in this case is the n a t u r a l
mother of J o s e p h Price.

Turney pursued a liability claim with Atlanta

Casualty Insurance Company, the liability carrier providing coverage for David
Gurr. Atlanta Casualty paid its policy limits of $25,000.00.
Turney filed a claim based on the insurance policy issued to Split
Mountain Construction by American States Insurance ("American States"). A
copy of that policy is included in the record. (R10-53).
1

The American States policy consists of two parts, a commercial general
liability coverage form and a business auto coverage form.
On August 3 1 , 1995, American States filed this lawsuit seeking a
declaratory judgment action p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Annotated § 78-33-1 to
determine whether coverage was provided under the policy.
Each party filed a motion for summary judgment in the case.

On

September 18, 1996, oral arguments were held on both motions for summary
judgment.
The trial court, J u d g e J o h n R. Anderson presiding, granted the
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
A summary judgment order concluding the declaratory judgment action
and granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, was signed by
Judge Anderson on October 3, 1996. (R202-3)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The American States insurance policy provides coverage to a partnership
insured u n d e r the name of Split Mountain Construction. J o h n Turney is a
partner in that business. Debra Turney is J o h n Tumey's spouse. Joseph Price
is Debra Turney's son who was killed in an automobile accident.

The

American States i n s u r a n c e policy provides no u n d e r i n s u r e d automobile
coverage for Price's accident. The insurance policy only provides coverage for
the partnership, and for the partners and their spouses if they are engaged in
business activities. That is not the case with Price. Accordingly, there is no
insurance coverage under the American States' policy.

2

ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly determined that the Split Mountain Construction is a
partnership, and a separate entity from its partners, for purposes of
determining the insurance coverage that applies.
The real question raised in this appeal is what form of business Split
Mountain

Construction

determination

what

was

insurance

operating

under,

and

coverage existed

based

for Split

on

that

Mountain

Construction under the American States policy. There is different coverage for
sole proprietorships t h a n there is for partnerships under the terms of the
American States insurance policy.
Section II of the American States policy is entitled "WHO IS AN
INSURED" that section states as follows:
1.

If you are designated in the Declarations as:
a

an individual, you and your spouse are insured, b u t
only with respect to the conduct of the business of
which you are the sole owner.

b.

a partnership or joint venture, you are an insured.
Your members, your partners, and their spouses are
also insureds, but only with respect to the conduct of
your business.

c.

a n organization other t h a n a partnership or joint
venture, you are an insured. Your "executive officers"
and directors are insureds, b u t only with respect to
their duties as your officers or directors. Your
stockholders are also insureds, but only with respect
to their liability as stockholders.

The declaration sheets of the insurance policy are clear that the type of
business insured is a partnership. On the coversheet for the declarations the
form says named insured.

Next to that, the form h a s been typed in "VENT

3

SLAUGH & JOHN TURNEY DBA: SPLIT MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION." (R178)
Commercial Liability Coverage Part Declarations, Page CGI (R179), list the
named insured as "VENT SLAUGH & JOHN TURNEY DBA:"

Immediately

under that it says "Form of Business: Partnership." (R179) Split Mountain
Construction h a s always represented itself to American S t a t e s a s a
partnership. The partners are Vent Slaugh and J o h n Turney. J o h n Turney's
spouse Debra, is the mother of Joseph Price. Debra Turney is seeking to obtain
underinsured motorist coverage for Joseph's accident.
An audit request was sent to Split Mountain Construction. The audit
requested information regarding the operation of the business.
stated "Are You Operating As:" Then listed: "
Corporation

Individual

The form
Partnership

Other." The defendant checked "Partnership."

On the

same form, the owners are listed as "John M. Turney, 51%" and 'Vent Slaugh,
49%."

The document was filled out, and signed by, Debbie Turney, the

defendant in this case. The document was dated September 25, 1995. (R182)
It is clear that there are two individuals working together as co-owners
of the Split Mountain Construction business. They are running the business
to make a profit. Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-3 defines a partnership as; "an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit." Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-3.1 defines a joint venture. It states: "A
joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners of a single business enterprise." The defendant h a s not attempted to
present any evidence t h a t Split Mountain is not a partnership or a joint

4

venture. Instead, the defendant's attempt to argue from cases that are not on
point, t h a t the partners also are insureds in their individual capacity.

The

plaintiffs reasoning is not consistent with Utah law.
"[T]he Utah Supreme Court has ruled that partnerships are distinct and
separate legal entities." Salt Lake Knee Rehab, v. Salt Lake Medicine, 909 P.2d
266 (Ut. App. 1995). Citing Cottonwood Mall Co., v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 501
(Ut. 1988).

The court further stated that partnerships are distinct and

separate legal entities from the partners.

Id. at 269 citing Wall Inv. Co. v.

Garden Gate Distrib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Ut. 1979).
The defendant's reliance on Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc., 373 N.W. 2d
902 (N.D. 1985), is not instructive to the court in this case. In Carlson the
individual insured was operating several businesses as a sole proprietor under
his own name. In that case, the court held: "A sole proprietorship which is
conducted under a trade name is not a separate legal entity." Carlson at 905.
Plaintiff does not dispute this point which is basic hornbook law.

If the

defendant in this case was doing business as a sole proprietor the coverage
issues raised would be different. The same is true of the defendant's reliance
on the case of O'Hanlan v. Harford Accident

and Indemnity

Company,

639

F.2d 1019(3dCir. 1981).
Black's Law Dictionary defines sole proprietorship as follows: "A form of
business in which one person owns all the assets of the business in contrast
to a partnership incorporation. The sole proprietor is solely liable for all the
debts of the business." (Black's Law Dictionary abridged to the Fifth Edition
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at 723.) Where there is no separate business entity the issues are completely
different.

The cases that the defendant relies on involve sole proprietorship,

where the individual and business, are the same legal entity. That is not the
same issue which this court must address.
It is clear t h a t Split Mountain Construction is doing b u s i n e s s as a
partnership or joint venture as defined by Utah statutes. Accordingly, Section
11(1 )(b) of the American States policy is the applicable section to determine who
was a n insured. Based on the language of that provision of the policy which
states: If you are "A Partnership, or Joint Venture, you are an insured. Your
members, your partners, and their spouses are also insured, b u t only with
respect to the conduct of your business." Accordingly, the Split Mountain
partnership is insured; Mr. Slaugh and Mr. Turney, as members or partners, are
also insureds as are their spouses relative to conducting their business. None
of the defined insured include Price.
Even though the American States policy is written as a business policy,
the defendant attempts to argue that the coverage is for individuals, because
the individual partners are listed by name "dba Split Mountain Construction."
It is clear that the words "Vent Slaugh and J o h n Turney, dba Split Mountain
Construction" show that two individuals are doing business as a partnership
or joint venture.

Only the partnership or joint venture is an insured.

The

individuals named are not doing business as sole proprietors. There is no
coverage for Joseph Price in this case.

6

Whether Price is a "Family Member" is a question of fact.
Based on the previous arguments of plaintiff, plaintiff does not believe
that the issue of whether Joseph Price was a family member is relevant to this
appeal. However, if the court decides that the issue is relevant, it is a factual
question which m u s t decided by the trial court. The defendant improperly
relies on the affidavit that was filed by her in this matter.

That affidavit,

however, was submitted to the court unsigned at the time the plaintiffs reply
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment was filed. The
affidavit is improper and should not be considered. Accordingly, if this court
decides t h a t the issue is relevant for this appeal, this matter should be
remanded to the trial court to rule on this issue.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff urges this court to affirm the district court's granting of its
motion for summary judgment. The insurance policy involved in this litigation
is a business insurance policy that provides coverage to the partnership of
Split Mountain Construction. There is no coverage provided for Joseph Price.
Accordingly, the plaintiff respectfully requests that this court affirm the trial
court's decision.
DATED this 13th day of J u n e , 1997.
DUNN & DUNN

TIM DALTON DUNN
KEVIN D. SWENSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, this 13th day of J u n e , 1997, to the
following:
Robert J . Debry
ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
3575 South Market Street, Suite 206
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§ 48-1-3 "PARTNERSHIP' DEFINED
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§ 48-1-3.1 JOINT VENTURE DEFINED
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PARTNERSHIP

835
Section
48-1-39.
48-1-40.

Rights of retiring or estate of deceased p a r t n e r
when the business is continued.
Accrual of actions.

48-1-6

(3) This chapter shall apply to limited partnerships except
in so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are
inconsistent herewith.
1994
48-1-3.1.

Part 2
U t a h L i m i t e d Liability
P a r t n e r s h i p Act
48-1-41.
48-1-42.
48-1-43.
48-1-44.
48-1-45.
48-1-46.
48-1-47.
48-1-48.

Title.
Registration of limited liability partnerships.
Scope of chapter — Choice of law.
Foreign limited liability partnerships.
Name of registered limited liability partnership.
Professional relationship — Personal liability.
Regulatory agency or board authority — Prohibitions on individuals apply.
Limited liability partnerships providing professional services.
PARTI
GENERAL PARTNERSHIP

48-1-1. Definition of t e r m s .
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Bankrupt" includes "bankrupt" under the federal
bankruptcy laws or "insolvent" under any state insolvency
law.
(2) "Business" includes every trade, occupation, or profession.
(3) "Conveyance" includes every assignment, lease,
mortgage, or encumbrance.
(4) "Court" includes every court and judge having jurisdiction in the case.
(5) "Limited liability partnership" m e a n s a general
partnership registered under Section 48-1-42 and complying with Section 48-1-43.
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, limited liability company, limited liability partnership, corporation, or other association.
(7) "Real property" includes land and any interest or
estate in land.
1994
48-1-2. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of k n o w l e d g e a n d n o t i c e .
(1) Within the meaning of this chapter, a person is deemed
to have knowledge of a fact not only when he h a s actual
knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge of such
other facts t h a t to act in disregard of them shows bad faith.
(2) A person has notice of a fact within the meaning of this
chapter when the person who claims the benefit of the notice:
(a) states the fact to such person; or
(b) delivers through the mail, or by other means of
communication, a written statement of the fact to such
person, or to a proper person 'at his place of business or
residence.
1953
48-1-3. "Partnership" d e n n e d .
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a partnership
is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
coowners a business for profit.
(b) "Partnership" when used in a statute of t h e state,
includes a limited liability partnership registered under
Section 48-1-42, unless the context requires otherwise.
(2) An association formed under any other statute of this
state, or any statute adopted by authority other t h a n the
authority of this state, is not a partnership under this chapter,
Unless such association would have been a partnership in this
state prior to the adoption of this chapter.

J o i n t v e n t u r e d e n n e d — A p p l i c a t i o n of c h a p ter.
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons
to carry on as co-owners of a single business enterprise.
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of
joint ventures.
1985
48-1-4.

R u l e s for d e t e r m i n i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of a partnership.
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules
shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Section 48-1-13, persons who
are not partners as to each other are not partners as to
third persons.
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by entireties, joint property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish a partnership, whether
such co-owners do or do not share any profits made by t h e
use of the property.
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself
establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any
property from which the returns are derived.
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima facie evidence t h a t he is a partner in t h e
business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such
profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise.
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord.
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a
deceased partner.
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of
payment vary with the profits of the business.
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will
of a business or other property by installments or
otherwise.
1953

48-1-5. P a r t n e r s h i p property.
All property originally brought into the partnership stock,
or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account
of the partnership, is partnership property.
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired
with partnership funds is partnership property.
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the
partnership name.
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name,
though without words of inheritance, passes the entire estate
of the grantor, unless a contrary intent appears.
1953
48-1-6.

P a r t n e r a g e n t of p a r t n e r s h i p a s t o p a r t n e r s h i p
business.
(1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for t h e
purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, including
the execution in the partnership name of any instrument for
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of t h e
partnership of which he is a member, binds the partnership,
unless the partner so acting h a s in fact no authority to act for
the partnership in the particular m a t t e r and the person with
whom he is dealing h a s knowledge of the fact t h a t he h a s no
such authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the
carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual way •
does not bind the partnership, unless authorized by the other
partners.

